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I.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.

Do the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

and Article I, Section 2(b) of the California Constitution
prohibit imposing liability on a vendor whose software enables
the delivery of drug information for consumers (medication
summaries known as monographs which are not FDA regulated
or required) based on a negligence standard, where that
information is not authored by the vendor, and is derived from
government records and true?
2.

Does a vendor whose software enables the delivery

of the monographs that pharmacies may choose to provide to
patients have a duty to require that pharmacies distribute only
eight-section monographs, where (a) the pharmacy demands
that the vendor make available for its use a five-section
monograph that expressly states it is only a summary; (b) the
FDA requires the pharmacy to give patients a Medication
Guide, the wording of which is FDA regulated, which includes
complete warnings about the alleged risks of the medication;
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and (c) the five-section monograph refers to and directs patients
to read the Medication Guide, which it is meant to supplement,
not supplant?
3.

Can a software vendor be held strictly liable on a

products liability theory for injuries allegedly sustained by a
third party based on truthful information delivered using its
software?
4.

Does Section 230 of the Communications Decency

Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, bar state-law claims against a software
vendor premised upon use ofthe vendor's software to deliver a
non-FDA required or regulated monograph authored by a third
party?
II.

WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

For decades, courts across the country have rejected
lawsuits seeking to hold publishers of consumer products
information responsible for the safety of the products discussed.
Those courts correctly have held that the First Amendment does
not permit liability on a failure-to-warn theory for truthful
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information provided to consumers, barring a promise about the
product's quality or safety. Thus, the publisher of a book about
mushrooms is not liable if the book fails to warn about
particular mushrooms. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d
1033 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Winter"). In contrast, if a publisher
guarantees a product's quality, it may be liable for harm caused
by the product. Hanberry v. Hearst Com., 276 Cal.App.2d 680
(1969). See Section IV.A, infra.
Limiting liability to the situations where a definite
undertaking is made is necessary to ensure that First
Amendment rights are not trampled by turning those who
publish and distribute speech on matters of significant public
interest into guarantors of a product's safety, regardless of their
intent. The potentially endless liability they would face if they
could be held liable to anyone who claims they were harmed by
a publication's contents inevitably would chill speech.
These settled principles should have guided the Court of
Appeal in this matter. Yet, the Court's published decision
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makes those involved in distributing truthful information
potentially liable for negligence claims brought by plaintiffs
who allege the information is incomplete- even where, as here,
the publication expressly states it is incomplete and refers
readers to a document with more complete information, that
was required to be distributed with the publication (including
the particular information alleged to have been omitted). Worse
still, the Court refused to strike Plaintiffs' products liability
claim- although Plaintiffs recognized the claim was
indefensible and abandoned it on appeal- subjecting software
vendors to liability without fault for truthful information
distributed using their software. The Court of Appeal's
decision is unprecedented; indeed, consistent with settled First
Amendment principles, PDX is aware of no appellate court in
the nation that has upheld such liability against a software
vendor.
PDX, Inc. and National Health Information Network
(collectively "PDX") provide software that allows phannacies
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to print medication summaries known as monographs that
pharmacists may choose to provide when patients receive
medication. The monographs are authored and regularly
updated by a third party, Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc.
("WKH"). The Court of Appeal mistakenly asserted that these
monographs are legally required- they decidedly are not.
Monographs are designed to supplement- not supplant- a
pharmacist's legally-mandated obligation to provide patientspecific counseling, and for certain medications, give patients
an FDA-approved Medication Guide written by the drug's
manufacturer. Plaintiff Kathleen Hardin alleges she suffered
severe injuries after her pharmacist at Safeway, Inc.,
purportedly gave her only the monograph (that directs readers
to the Medication Guide), and not the FDA-required
Medication Guide (which contained the warnings she alleges
would have prevented her injury).
In a short paragraph, the Court dispatched PDX's First
Amendment argument, believing PDX failed to establish that
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the monograph was true. Op. 13. This reverses the burden of
proof; plaintiffs bear the burden of proving falsity in cases
implicating First Amendment rights. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Nizam-Aldine v. City of
Oakland, 47 Cal.App.4th 364 (1996). It also ignores the
fundamental First Amendment interests at stake here.
The Court of Appeal's published decision held that PDX
may be liable under a gratuitous undertaking or "good
Samaritan" theory- that because Safeway used PDX's software
to distribute truthful information about the medicine Plaintiff
was prescribed, PDX could be liable if the monograph did not
warn her about all of the medicine's alleged risks. But PDX is,
at most, a mere link in the distribution chain -not a publisher of consumer product information. C.T. 38. As this Court
recognized in Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33, 48-49 (2006),
"the responsibility of publishers for offensive content is greater
than that of mere distributors." Thus, PDX's liability is more
remote than in the publisher or author context, where courts
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consistently reject liability. Review is necessary to make clear
that the First Amendment does not permit liability against those
involved in distributing truthful speech regarding matters of
public interest on the thin reed of negligence. Section IV, infra.
The Court also should grant review because the Court of
Appeal fundamentally misconstrued - and dramatically
expanded - the gratuitous undertaking or "good Samaritan"
theory. As this Court made clear, liability under this theory is
limited by the scope of the undertaking; thus a good Samaritan
is not liable for failing to do something it did not undertake to
do. Artiglio v. Coming Inc., 18 Cal.4th 604,617-618 (1998)
("Artiglio"). During the time relevant to this litigation, PDX
never undertook to enable distribution of a drug summary
containing all FDA-required medication information and
warnings. Under its agreement with Safeway- which defined
PDX's undertaking- Safeway requested, and PDX agreed to to
permit its software to print, a five-section monograph, which
stated it was not complete. Exercising its professional duty to
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its patients, Safeway alone decided whether to give patients the
monograph to supplement oral counseling from the pharmacist
and FDA-required documents. C.T. 39. PDX knew Safeway's
patients would be under a doctor's care and the pharmacy was
required to provide them individualized counseling and
applicable FDA-mandated Medication Guides. As a matter of
law, therefore, the drug information distributed using PDX's
software was not necessary to protect patients. In finding a
duty on these facts, the Court of Appeal created a direct conflict
with a decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc., 187 Cal.App.4th 709 (20 10)
("Rivera"), which this Court should resolve. Section V.A,
infra.
This Court also should grant review to make clear that
PDX was entitled to rely on the warnings that others, with a
direct connection to Plaintiff, legally were obligated to give her.
In Webb v. Special Electric Co., Case No. S209927 ("Webb"),
this Court will decide whether a broker can be held liable for
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failing to warn about a dangerous product where the purchaser
- a sophisticated manufacturer- had a direct duty and ability to
warn consumers. This case presents a similar issue. The law
required Plaintiff's physician and pharmacy to warn Plaintiff
about alleged risks. C.T. 38-41; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201,208. As a
software vendor, PDX was entitled to rely on these
professionals to fulfill their legal duty to Plaintiff; it had no
obligation to warn Plaintiff or to ensure that Safeway fulfilled
its obligation to inform her. Section V.B, infra.
Review also is necessary to make clear that Plaintiffs
may not state a products liability claim- and potentially subject
PDX to no-fault liability- for true information generated as
intended by PDX's software. For the first time, the Court of
Appeal's decision opens the door to an array of lawsuits
claiming that truthful information or speech produced through
computer software has harmed the plaintiff in some way,
exposing software vendors to liability for distributing
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information. Its potential for mischief cannot be overstated.
Section VI, infra.
Finally, the Court should grant review to correct the
Court of Appeal's misapplication of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 ("Section
230"). Like the broad constitutional protection the law has long
provided information distributors, Section 230 provides
immunity to online service providers from state-law claims
based on third party content. It is undisputed here that WKH,
not PDX, authored the monograph Plaintiffs challenge, and
PDX merely provided Safeway with access to the specific
portions ofWKH's content requested by Safeway. The Court
of Appeal's decision will expose online providers to liability
merely for providing users access to information they
specifically request- which Section 230 was designed to
prevent. Section VII, infra.
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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Using an Automated Process, PDX Distributes
Electronic Summaries of Drug Information
Authored By Third Parties, which Pharmacies
Voluntarily Provide to Patients.

PDX provides pharmacy practice management software
used to electronically distribute drug information to
pharmacies, who may provide this information to customers.
C.T. 38. The software delivers licensed information to
integrated healthcare delivery networks and more than 9,500
pharmacies. Id. The software allows the printing of
monographs for tens of thousands of drugs that summarize
FDA information in easy-to-read language. Id. PDX does not
author or update the monographs- which WKH exclusively
authors and updates. PDX merely provides software that
enables pharmacies to make the monographs available to
patients when they receive their medications. Id. The
pharmacist has sole discretion whether to provide a monograph
to a customer. Id.

II

For certain medications, including the drug Mrs. Hardin
was prescribed, federal law requires pharmacies to give patients
FDA-approved and regulated Medication Guides. 21 C.F.R.
§§ 201, 208. Unlike FDA-approved drug product labeling or
"Package Inserts," which are written for healthcare
professionals, Medication Guides are intended to give patients
information about how to use a drug safely, including how to
recognize potential side effects that may require medical
attention. I d. As the monographs generated by Safeway using
PDX software make clear, monographs are not intended to
duplicate, replace, or add to the Medication Guides, Package
Inserts, or particularized medical advice from a patient's doctor
or pharmacist. C.T. 38-41, 131, 147.
The Court of Appeal rested its ruling on the premise that
the monographs are "part of a self-regulating action plan
required under public law." Op. 2 (citing Pub.L. No. 104-180
(Aug. 6, 1996) 110 Stat. 1593 (the "Action Plan")). This is
incorrect. Congress rejected a law that would have required
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manufacturers to produce consumer medication information
called "MedGuides." C.T. 776. Public Law 104-180 instead
called for a "plan to be implemented on a voluntary basis and
without a regulatory mandate." Id. (emphasis added). Other
record evidence reinforces this conclusion.

See,~,

C.T. 741

(Action Plan provides "recommendations"); C.T. 746
(discussing "Private Sector Voluntary Action Plan"); C.T. 771
(Action Plan designed to "voluntarily adopt a long-range
strategy" for consumer medication information). See also C.T.
789, 791, 797-798. Nothing in the Action Plan remotely
suggests the monographs are legally required to be distributed,
or purports to require any particular language or information in
the monographs that pharmacies may voluntarily give patients.
C.T. 661, 771.
B.

Mrs. Hardin Suffered Side Effects.

In March of2010, Mrs. Hardin's physician allegedly
prescribed her Lamictal for depression. C.T. 4-6. At the time,
Mrs. Hardin was also taking another medication. C.T. 4. She
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claims that when she filled her prescription for Lamotrigine (the
generic form ofLamictal), she only received a monograph
written by WKH, which was electronically distributed to her
Safeway pharmacy using PDX's software. Id.
WKH provides PDX with electronic files containing
content for monographs through PDX's affiliated company,
NHIN. C.T. 38-39. WKH writes, formats, develops and
updates the drug product information that PDX accesses
through its license with WKH. Id. PDX's software then
electronically transfers the monographs to the PDX Host, a
central computer server operated at Safeway's headquarters. Id.
Safeway regularly received electronic updates from the PDX
Host server through an online private network computer
connection. Id. Specific drug information is linked to the
medication, using WKH methods, which the pharmacy staff can
select from and print. Id. In 2006, nearly five years before
Mrs. Hardin filled her prescription, PDX revised its software at
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Safeway's request so that Safeway could print only a fivesection version of monographs. C.T. 661,762-765, 720.
It is undisputed that as a software provider, PDX had no

interaction or contract with Mrs. Hardin or any other customer,
no access to patients' drug history information, and no ability to
control whether any customer received the Medication Guide,
let alone the monograph that PDX's software enabled Safeway
to give its patients. The monograph that Safeway chose to give
Mrs. Hardin made clear that she should not rely only on it to
provide comprehensive information, noting that it is
"[i]mportant to read the Medication Guide before use[.]" C.T.
41, 130-131, 132-133, 147-148 (emphasis added). It also
specifically cautioned patients to "CHECK WITH YOUR
DOCTOR IMMEDIATELY ... [i]fyou experience ... red,
swollen, peeling or blistered skin." C.T. 147 (emphasis in
original); see Section V .A.1, infra.
It is undisputed that Safeway was legally required to give

Mrs. Hardin the Medication Guide that contained the FDA-
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required warnings; Plaintiffs allege that Safeway failed to
satisfY that legal obligation. C.T. 4-5; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201,208.
It also is undisputed that Mrs. Hardin's physician was legally
obligated to warn her of risks; Plaintiffs allege that he also
failed to satisfY that legal obligation. C.T. 4, 6, 38-41; 21
C.F.R. §§ 201, 208. In addition, information about this
particular medication and its associated health risks was
available online on the FDA's public website. C.T. 40 n.1.
Mrs. Hardin alleges that she suffered blindness and
permanent scarring after taking Lam ictal. She and her husband
sued her physician, GlaxoSmithKline, Taro Pharmaceuticals,
Safeway, Inc., WKH and PDX, for negligence and products
liability. On July 3, 2012, the trial court dismissed WKH,
relying upon Rivera to conclude that "Plaintiffs [could not]
establish as a matter of law that WKH owed any duty to them."
C.T. 154, 259. The court dismissed GlaxoSmithKline from this
action in October 2012. Docket, 10/18/12. Although the trial
court refused to dismiss Safeway, Inc. and Mrs. Hardin's
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medical providers, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the
claims barred by California's one-year statute oflimitations for
health care providers. Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court, 2014
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4364, at * 19 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
6119/14). Thus, Taro and PDX are the only remaining
defendants.
IV.

THE COURT OF APPEAL'S
DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY BURDENS
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A.

A Business Involved in Distributing Consumer
Product Information Cannot Be Held Liable for
Distributing True Information.

The Court of Appeal paid little heed to PDX's First
Amendment argument, asserting without analysis that PDX did
not establish "that WKH's monographs are 'truthful
summaries' of official FDA proceedings." Op. 13. Even if this
were true - although, as discussed above, it is not (Section
III.B, supra)- it would tum the First Amendment on its head.
PDX did not bear the burden of proving that WKH's
monographs were true; Plaintiffs bore the burden of
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establishing they were false. Philadelphia Newspapers, 475
U.S. 767. Plaintiffs did not meet their burden- or even assert
that the information produced through PDX's software was
false; the Court of Appeal plainly erred in summarily
dismissing the significant First Amendment interests at issue.
First, the U.S. Supreme Court never has upheld a claim
based on truthful statements on a matter of public concern,
particularly where those statements are based on public records
- here, drug information provided by the FDA. In Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975), the
court reversed a judgment against a broadcaster for publishing a
rape victim's name in contravention of Georgia law, holding
that, "[a]t the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
will not allow ... liability" for truthfully disseminating
information "released to the public in official court records."
Id. at 489, 491, 496. As this Court has held, Cox makes clear
that "'States may not impose sanctions" on the dissemination of
"truthful information contained in official court records open to
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public inspection."' Gates v. Discovery Commn's, Inc., 34
Cal.4th 679, 693, 696 (2004) (emphasis added) (striking
invasion of privacy claim for publishing facts from court
records). This rule applies not only to court records but "to
public records in general[.]" Id. at 673 (citation omitted;
emphasis added).
But even ifPDX bore the burden of establishing truthalthough it did not- it met its burden. PDX' s software permits
the electronic distribution of truthful summaries of FDA drug
information, written and updated by WKH. Like the Package
Insert and Medication Guide created for this medication, the
monograph warns that Lamotrigine may trigger an allergic rash:
"POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS: [ ... ] Symptoms of an allergic
reaction include rash .... " C. T. 4 I, 131, 14 7. It also repeatedly
advises patients to consult with their doctor and pharmacist to
obtain advice regarding risks of the drug. Id. Most
importantly, it discloses that it is only a summary- namely that
its "information is generalized and is not intended as specific
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medical advice"- advising patients to read "carefully" the
FDA-approved Medication Guide. Id.
Second, courts across the country uniformly reject
liability for non-reputational injuries purportedly stemming
from negligent publication. Although plaintiffs do not often
attempt to assert claims against entities that merely facilitate the
distribution of speech such as PDX- demonstrating the
unprecedented nature of the liability found here- the law is
clear that such claims require more than mere negligence. See,
~.Smith

v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-153 (1959) (book

store not responsible for content of books it sells absent
showing of scienter); Osmond v. EWAP, Inc., 153 Cal.App.3d
842, 852-854 (1984) (same); Rest.2d Torts,§ 581(1), corns. d, e
("one who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter
published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if,
he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character").
Courts also consistently reject claims against publishers,
although they have a more direct connection to challenged
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speech. In Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036-1037, the court rejected a
negligence claim against the publisher of a book about
mushrooms because "the gentle tug of the First Amendment
and the values embodied therein would remind us of the social
costs" if courts imposed such a duty on publication. Id.
Similarly, in Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125-126 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989), aff' d, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991 ), the court refused to
impose negligence liability where plaintiff allegedly died from
following a diet in a book defendant published. And in Brandt
v. Weather Channel, 42 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1345-1346 (S.D. Fla.
1999), the district court refused to impose a duty of care on a
publisher because it would chill "well established first
amendment rights." Id. 1

See also,~, Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F.Supp. 282,
283-284 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (no negligence liability for
publishing book that allegedly led to explosion, in part
because of the "tremendous burden such a duty would place
upon defendant publishers, the weighty societal interest in
free access to ideas, and potentially unlimited liability").
1
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This deference to the First Amendment applies even
when defendant is the speaker. For example, in First Equity
Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179-180 (2d
Cir. 1989), the court rejected claims based on inaccurate
financial information, emphasizing that because the publication
was widely disseminated, "[t]he class of potential plaintiffs is
multitudinous" and "the user should bear the risk of failing to
verifY the accuracy of a summary in the absence of proof of a
knowing misstatement." Id. at 180. And in Yanase v.
Automobile Club of So. California, 212 Cal.App.3d 468, 474476 (1989), the court refused to hold liable the publisher of a
tour guide after plaintiffs' decedent was killed in the parking lot
of a motel it listed. 2

2

See also, Q,&_, Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc., 130
Misc.2d 25, 30-31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (trade association not
liable for injuries resulting from industry standards it
promulgated); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432
F.Supp. 990,993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting motion to
dismiss; "Merck's right to publish free of fear of liability is
guaranteed by the First Amendment.").
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These cases should have controlled here. The
monograph Safeway obtained using PDX's software and gave
Plaintiff does not warrant or guarantee that it is complete; to the
contrary, it affirmatively states the information is "generalized"
and not intended as specific medical advice. C.T. 147. The
monograph also specifically warns patients that serious allergic
reactions are possible, directing them to "seek immediate
medical attention." C.T. 41, 131, 147 (emphasis added).
PDX's only role is providing software as the conduit between
WKH and pharmacies. C.T. 39. Given the voluntary nature of
the non-FDA regulated drug information distributed through
PDX's software, the First Amendment prohibits holding PDX
liable for alleged negligence in allowing Safeway to give
patients a five-section (rather than an eight-section) monograph.
The Court of Appeal's decision could be applied to any
publisher or distributor of truthful consumer products
information. It must be reversed.
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B.

Even if the First Amendment Permits Imposing
a Duty to Warn on PDX, It Prohibits Liability
for Anything Except Knowing Falsity.

Although it is undisputed that Mrs. Hardin was under the
care of health care professionals, and that PDX had no
interaction with her- or any patients -the Court of Appeal
embraced the negligence standard Plaintiffs advocated. The
First Amendment demands much more than mere negligence.
In Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 22 Ohio St.3d 286, 291 (1986),
for example, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a claim against a
newspaper for losses allegedly sustained due to an inaccurate
investor report because "merely inaccurate reporting" will not
support liability. Id. at 288 (citation omitted). Quoting a
leading treatise, the court held that:
In the absence of a contract, fiduciary relationship, or
intentional design to cause injury, a newspaper publisher
is not liable to a member of the public ... unless he
wilfully originates or circulates it knowing it to be false,
and it is calculated to and does, as the proximate cause,
result in injury to another person.
Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added). It held that "[r]ecovery
may be had at best only for knowing or reckless falsehood," but
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even if plaintiff established such recklessness, it would not
matter because defendant owed plaintiff no duty of care. Id. at
289-290. "[T]he competing public policy and constitutional
concerns tilt decidedly in favor of the press when mere
negligence is alleged." Id. at 291.
The Court of Appeal's decision ignores these profound
First Amendment interests. Plainly, if Plaintiffs physician and
pharmacist had fulfilled their legal obligations, Plaintiff would
have no claim against PDX. The decision imposes the burdens
of manufacturers and distributors on software vendors like PDX
-permitting liability because PDX allegedly did not adequately
warn Plaintiff about the risks ofLamotrigine. Yet, PDX played
no role in prescribing or delivering this medication, and had no
way to warn Mrs. Hardin, or any of the tens of thousands of
Safeway's pharmacy patients. And because liability against
Plaintiffs physician and pharmacist has been rejected, PDX
runs the risk of standing alone when the jury decides how much
to award for Plaintiffs injuries. No software vendor should be
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exposed to this kind of risk for its role in distributing First
Amendment-protected speech.

v.
SOFTWARE VENDORS WHO ENABLE
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TRUE CONSUMER
PRODUCT INFORMATION HAVE NO
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO WARN ABOUT THE
ALLEGED DANGERS OF PRODUCTS
The Court of Appeal cited and purported to distinguish
Rivera, 187 Cal.App.4th 709. Op. 8-9. But review of both
decisions demonstrates that they directly conflict on a key issue
this Court should resolve - whether a vendor whose software
enables the distribution of truthful consumer product
information owes a duty under tort law to consumers who
might receive that information.
In Rivera, the Fourth District rejected a pharmacy
patient's claim against First DataBank, which prepared and
published a monograph given when plaintiff filled his
prescription. Id. at 713-714. It concluded that the pharmacy's
failure to provide a medication guide or package insert "does
not impose any duty on [First DataBank] to change the style,
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format, or contents of its monograph." Id. at 720. As the trial
court in this case held in previously granting a Special Motion
to Strike by WKH (which prepared and published the
monograph):
[T)he Rivera Court addressed the issue of duty generally.
It held that defendant was neither the manufacturer, nor
the supplier, and that plaintiffs did not show that
defendant was obligated to provide any information to
them at all. (I d., at 719.) It further noted that
defendant's having disclaimed any obligation to provide
information in the monograph, the information was
merely supplemental and this further supported a finding
of no duty. (Ibid.) It did not hold that having undertaken
the task of providing information concerning potentially
life-threatening risks, it was obligated to do so in a nonnegligent manner.
Hardin v. Palo Alto Medical Foundation, Inc., 2012 WL
8261196, *3 (Cal. Super. 7/3/2012) (emphasis added). Thus, in
rejecting the claim against WKH, the trial court concluded that
"under the doctrine of stare decisis Plaintiffs cannot establish as
a matter of law that WKH owed any duty to them and this court
is obligated to find that Plaintiffs have no probability of
prevailing on their claims." I d. at *4 (citation omitted).
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The Court of Appeal ignored the broad holding from
Rivera in purporting to distinguish the cases. Op. 8-10. But
they cannot be distinguished. PDX was entitled to rely on
Safeway's legal obligation to provide counseling and FDArequired medication guides to patients. 21 C.F.R. § 208.24(e);
16 C.C.R. § 1707.2.
A.

The Gratuitous Undertaking Theory Cannot Be
Applied to Software Vendors.

In Artiglio, this Court carefully constrained the "good
Samaritan" liability articulated in Section 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, making clear that defendants
can be held liable only if plaintiffs establish all five elements of
the tort, and that "the duty of a good Samaritan is limited." 18
Cal.4th at 614, 615. 3 The Court rejected a claim against a
company based on research performed years earlier, concluding
3

Those elements include, as relevant here, that (I) the
actor (here, PDX) "undertook, gratuitously or for
consideration to render services to another" (here, Safeway);
and, (2) "the services rendered were of a kind the actor should
have recognized as necessary for the protection of third
persons" (Plaintiffs).
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it was not "'an undertaking of such breadth and magnitude as to
create a duty on the part of Dow Chemical to ensure the safety
of all of Dow Coming's silicone products."' Id. at 617 (citation
omitted). The Court concluded that the harm plaintiff alleged
was too "attenuated and remote" to support liability. Id. at 618.
The Court of Appeal purported to apply Artiglio, but paid
little heed to the strict requirements to establish liabilityexpanding the application of this limited theory far beyond this
Court's strict constraints. Op. 10-11. Two elements in
particular are necessary to ensure that those who merely
facilitate the delivery of truthful information, such as PDX, are
not exposed to potentially unlimited liability.
1.

PDX Did Not Undertake to Provide a
Comprehensive Medication Warning.

The Court of Appeal overlooked the facts ofthis case in
defining PDX's undertaking. Op. 10-11. As this Court made
clear in Artiglio:
The foundational requirement of the good Samaritan rule
is that in order for liability to be imposed upon the actor,
he must specifically have undertaken to perform the task
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he is charged with having performed negligently, for
without the actual assumption of the undertaking there
can be no correlative duty to perform that undertaking
carefully.
18 Cal. 4th at 614-615 (citation omitted).
The decision in Dekens v. Underwriters Labs. Inc., 107
Cal.App.4th 1177 (2003), is instructive. There, plaintiffs sued
for asbestos exposure their decedent sustained from repairing
small appliances. Id. at 1179-1180. They alleged that "by
testing small appliances and certifYing them as safe, [defendant]
had undertaken to guarantee [the decedent's] safety from illness
resulting from his exposure to asbestos while repairing those
small appliances." Id. at 1179. The Court affirmed summary
judgment for defendant because defendant "never undertook to
test small appliances for medical safety or to certifY the
appliances would not cause cancer." Id. at 1180. It made clear
that the scope of the undertaking necessarily is defined by the
specific actions taken or promises made. Id. at 1184-1185.
Numerous courts have rejected attempts to hold
monograph publishers or distributors liable for harm allegedly
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resulting from the medications discussed, concluding they owe
no duty to warn patients of all potential harms. In Cheatham v.
TEVA Pharm. USA, 726 F.Supp.2d 1021, 1024 (E.D. Ark.,
5/20/1 0), for example, the court rejected a patient's claim
against WKH, concluding it owed no duty to warn or instruct
plaintiff regarding possible side effects, for many of the reasons
enunciated in Rivera. Id. In AB v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, 2013 Phila.Ct.Com.Pl. LEXIS 84, at *19-32
(2013), the court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to ascribe a duty to
defendants that voluntarily undertook to develop medical
literature. The court emphasized that the record lacked
evidence to suggest either defendant "assumed the
[manufacturers'] affirmative duty to render services, which it
knew were necessary for Plaintiffs' protection .... " Id. at *3233. See also Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehabilitation
Center, Inc., 952 P.2d 768 (Colo. Ct.App. 1997) (dentist owed
no duty of care to plaintiffs who relied on dentist's public
statements in obtaining treatment).
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The Court of Appeal addressed none of these cases.
Instead, it invoked a handful of distinguishable and
unpersuasive cases. Op. 10. In FNS Mortgage Srvc. Corp. v.
Pacific General Group, Inc., 24 Cai.App.4th 1564 (1994),
defendant positioned itself as the sole entity that would inspect
plumbing products for conformity with standards it alone
established, which it alone enforced by de listing or withdrawing
its certification. Id. at 1567. Its purpose was "to assist state
and local governmental entities in the development and
enforcement of their plumbing codes." Id. Under those unique
facts, the court found that defendant undertook to perform
services it should have recognized as necessary to protect third
persons. Id. at 1572. Nothing like that exists here. PDX's
undertaking was merely to provide software enabling Safeway,
at its option and in the exercise of its professional discretion, to
print a monograph with the WKH content Safeway requested,
which was expressly supplemental to the separate Medication
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Guide Safeway legally was obligated to give patients. C.T. 3841; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 208.
Similarly, in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal.App.2d
at 684, defendant affirmatively guaranteed that it had
investigated the product advertised and confirmed it was
"good," and "guarantee[d] replacement or refund" of defective
products. Id. at 682. The court held that a duty arose because
defendant "voluntarily involved itself into the marketing
process, having in effect loaned its reputation to promote and
induce the sale of a given product." Id. at 684. Thus,
defendant's duty turned on its express invitation to consumers
to rely on its promise and purchase the product. PDX here
made no such promise- to the contrary, the monograph that
Safeway gave Plaintiff made clear it was a summary and was
not complete. C.T. 9; see also C.T. 131, 147. 4

4

See also Op. 10, citing Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer
Health, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-325-JAR, 2013 U.S.Dist. Lexis
106191 *13, *23-24 (E.D. Mo. 2013), which relied
exclusively on Missouri and Kentucky law, to reject a motion
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Relying on these cases and offering scant analysis, the
Court of Appeal declared that "PDX assumed a duty of care by
undertaking to render services to Safeway .... " Op. 10-11. It
ignored the scope of the duty that PDX undertook, which was
defined by its agreement with Safeway and the monograph's
express statement that it did not provide complete information.
C.T. 39, 41, 130-133, 147-148. There is no evidence that PDX
assumed a duty to print out information that would give patients
every warning they might expect or want. C.T. 38-41.
The Court of Appeal clearly erred in rejecting this
fundamental point based only on its perplexing assertion, with

to dismiss filed by monograph publisher WKH because no
other case in those jurisdictions had rejected duty on similar
facts; Slater v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 771 F.Supp.2d 524,
527-528 (E.D. Pa. 2011 ), which rejected a fraudulent joinder
challenge, without purporting to undertake the complex duty
analysis, finding that the claims were not a "clear legal
impossibility" because no Pennsylvania court had decided the
issue; and, Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316,325
(2002), which held that a pharmacy undertook a duty to warn
where "the patient could reasonably interpret the warning
form as a complete and comprehensive list of all known side
effects."
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no further analysis, that "it is the nature ofPDX's undertaking,
not the care with which it was carried out, that determines
whether it assumed a duty under section 324A in the first
place." Op. 11. As the undisputed evidence made clear, the
nature ofPDX's undertaking was to provide a monograph to
supplement the pharmacist's advice and the Medication Guide.
The Court apparently was influenced by (1) the Action
Plan (which it incorrectly believed rendered the monographs
legally required), 5 (2) PDX's encouragement to Safeway to
provide patients with eight-section monographs, and (3) the
2006 indemnity agreement between PDX and Safeway. Op. 23, 10-11. But PDX only undertook to provide software that
enabled Safeway to print a WKH monograph in the form that

5

The Action Plan guidelines are voluntary, and impose
no obligation to distribute monographs. C.T. 661, 771.
Indeed, given the strict First Amendment limitations
discussed above (Section IV.A, supra), mandatory regulations
likely would not have survived First Amendment scrutiny .
.!ig_,, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,256
(1974) (statute compelling newspaper to print editorial reply
"exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper").
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Safeway, in its professional discretion, chose. These facts
should have led the Court of Appeal to reject liability because if
PDX assumed any obligation- which PDX denies - its
agreement with Safeway and the express language of the
monograph limited the scope of that undertaking. This Court
should grant review and make clear that liability against those
who help distribute speech, such as software vendors like PDX,
is limited by the scope of their undertaking.
2.

Because Safeway Was Required to
Provide FDA-Mandated Warnings,
Plaintiffs' Alleged Injuries Were Not
Foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal made no attempt to analyze the
most important element of the duty analysis- foreseeabilitybeyond quoting the second element of the good Samaritan test.
Op. 11. The record does not support the Court's foreseeability
finding.
As California courts have made clear, '"[w]ithout
evidence that a defendant knew or reasonably should have
known there was any danger or potential danger associated with
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that defendant's act or failure to act, any imposition ofliability
would in essence be the imposition ofliability without fault."'
Ludwig v. City of San Diego, 65 Cai.App.4th 1105, 1111
(1998) (citation omitted). That court emphasized that "the law
of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others
which to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable."
Id. (citations omitted). The court's focus is not on whether a
particular plaintiff's injury was "reasonably foreseeable in light
of a particular defendant's conduct," but "whether the category
of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the
kind ofhann experienced that liability may appropriately be
imposed on the negligent party." Id. at 1114 (citation omitted).
In Ludwig. the court found no duty- despite evidence that
defendant acted spitefully in allegedly causing plaintiff's injury
- because defendant could not reasonably have known his
actions created a risk for plaintiff. Id. at 1113-1114.
The standard adopted in this case, by contrast, sanctions
unprecedented liability for independent publishers and software
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providers who help others voluntarily distribute truthful
consumer product information, based on nothing more than
plaintiff's claim that the information did not contain every
warning possible. Given the undisputed fact that monographs
are intended to supplement- not supplant - the medical advice
patients receive from their health care professionals and the
FDA-required Medication Guide, the harm Plaintiff allegedly
sustained was not foreseeable, and the voluntary monograph
was not necessary to protect Plaintiff. The Court of Appeal's
published decision drastically and unnecessarily expands the
circumstances in which a "good Samaritan" might be held
liable, and will chill speech. It must be reversed.
B.

A Distributor of Consumer Product

Information Is Entitled to Rely on its Business
Partner, Which Has a Direct Relationship with
the Consumer, to Provide all Warnings that
Business Partner Is Legally Required to
Provide.

In Webb, No. S209927, this Court will decide whether an
asbestos broker can be held liable for failing to provide a
warning where the purchaser - a sophisticated manufacturer -
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had a direct duty and ability to warn consumers about the
product's danger. The Court will decide whether the broker
was entitled to assume the manufacturer would perform its legal
duty and provide the required warnings to the consumer.
The issue presented in this case is one step removed,
because as a software vendor with no interaction with patients,
PDX is outside of the chain of distribution. PDX has no
knowledge of patients' medical or medication histories, and
therefore can have no legal duty to provide warnings to
patients. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal's decision exposes
PDX to liability on what is essentially a failure-to-warn theory,
because the truthful drug information that PDX enabled
Safeway to provide to its patients- at Safeway's sole discretion
-allegedly injured Plaintiff. Op. 11. 6 The same principles that

6

The Court of Appeal reached this conclusion despite
the fact that California follows the "learned intermediary
doctrine," which provides that a manufacturer only has a duty
to warn the doctor of the dangers of a prescription drug
because the doctor is in the best position to assess the pros
and cons of prescribing a drug in the context of the patient's
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Petitioner invokes in Webb fully apply here. "The general rule
is that every person has a right to presume that every other
person will perform his duty and obey the law, and in the
absence of reasonable ground to think otherwise it is not
negligence to assume that he is not exposed to danger which
comes to him only from violation of law or duty by such other
person." Petition for Review, filed 4/22/13, at *26 (citations
omitted).
Public policy should encourage admonitions like those
given by PDXto Safeway (C.T. 660, 748-751)-to enhance the
summary drug information that Safeway might provide to its
patients- so that companies are not punished for adopting and
medical history, and provide side effect warnings. Brown v.
Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 1061-1062, 1062 n.9 (1988);
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 40 Cal.3d 672, 679 (1985);
see also Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc., 6
Cal.4th 124, 132 (1993). Although federal and state
regulations may impose particular duties on pharmacists, any
common law duty to provide individualized warnings
generally begins and ends with a patient's doctor. It makes no
sense to impose a common law duty on the pharmacy's
vendor merely because its software enables the distribution of
optional drug information summaries.
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trying to enforce policies that are not legally required, but
which the companies believe may benefit the public. When
Safeway insisted that PDX modifY its software to provide the
five-section WKH monographs, PDX knew and relied on the
fact that Safeway pharmacists are obligated to provide
personalized counseling, and if the FDA believes a warning
regarding a particular medication is necessary, they are legally
obligated to provide that warning, in the form of the FDAmandated Medication Guide. This Court should grant review
and make clear that those who help distribute truthful consumer
product information such as PDX cannot be held liable for a
third party's alleged failure to provide legally-required
warnings.
VI.

THE COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFFS ABANDONED
PDX petitioned the Court of Appeal for rehearing, in part
because the Court failed to dismiss the products liability claim
that Plaintiffs abandoned. Pet. Reh., filed 7/7/14, at 4-5. The
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Court denied PDX's Petition, asserting that Plaintiffs claim
"that PDX's software program, not the information it produces,
is the defective product." Order, 7/21114 (emphasis in
original). But Plaintiffs did not come close to meeting their
burden under the SLAPP statute of establishing that PDX' s
software was defective; indeed, they did not even try. PDX's
software functioned as intended, enabling Safeway to distribute
the precise information Safeway chose. C.T. 720. The alleged
"defect" was that the software did not require Safeway to print
an eight-section monograph- that the information it relayed
purportedly was incomplete. C.T. 655. The Court's opinion
misstates Plaintiffs' claim and expands products liability law in
California, exposing software providers to no-fault products
liability claims for facilitating the distribution of true
information.
As PDX argued below, Plaintiffs' products liability claim
is defective because Plaintiffs failed to show that PDX is the
seller of a product as required by the Restatement (Third) of
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Torts (1988). O.B. 44-46, citing id. §§ 1-2. 7 A "product" is a
"physical article which results from a manufacturing process
and is ultimately delivered to a consumer." Pierson v. Sharp
Memorial Hosp., 216 Cal.App.3d 340,345 (1989).
"Information" is not a "product" under products liability law.
Torres v. City of Madera, No. CIVFF02-6385, 2005 WL
1683736, * 13-14 (E.D. Cal. 7111/05) (training materials for
Taser weapons not "products"; "[i]deas and expressions in
books are generally not considered products for purposes of
strict liability").
In Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035-36, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Court of Appeal's reasoning here, holding that
plaintiffs who relied on allegedly erroneous information in an
encyclopedia had no strict products liability claim because
expressions are not tangible, physical items. "The purposes
served by products liability law also are focused on the tangible
7

See Jiminez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.4th 473, 479
(2002) (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts; services are not
products).
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world and do not take into consideration the unique
characteristics of ideas and expression." Id. at I 034. The court
discussed the dangers from permitting strict products liability
for ideas or expression:
The threat ofliability without fault (financial
responsibility for our words and ideas in the
absence of fault or a special undertaking or
responsibility) could seriously inhibit those who
wish to share thoughts and theories .... [W]ith the
specter of strict liability, "[ w ]ould any author wish
to be exposed ... for writing on a topic which might
result in physical injury? ~ How to cut trees;
How to keep bees?" ... One might add: "Would
anyone undertake to guide by ideas expressed in
words either a discrete group, a nation, or
humanity in general?"
Id. at 1035 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1036 n.6
(discussing cases).
Plaintiffs do not claim they were harmed by PDX's
software program itself. They claim they were harmed by the
allegedly "deficient, incomplete monograph"- the information
the software program produces. C.T. 655. This is exactly what
courts uniformly reject. The Court of Appeal could not (and
did not) cite a single case to support its novel opinion that a
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software program that produced the very information intended
can be a defective product for purposes of products liability
law, where the only harm alleged purportedly resulted from
information the program generated. PDX is aware of none.
The Court of Appeal's opinion must be reversed.
VII.

THE COURT OF APPEAL'S PUBLISHED
DECISION WILL CREATE CONFUSION IN
APPLICATION OF SECTION 230

In the brick-and-mortar world, the legal analysis might
end here. Because PDX distributes information through
interactive servers, however, it enjoys independent protection
under Section 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230. The Court of Appeal
admittedly paid only "brief attention" to this argument. Op. at
11-12. It ignored the language of the statute, the policies on
which Congress based Section 230, and cases interpreting the
law to provide broad immunity for interactive computer
services that serve as conduits for content authored by thirdparties.
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Under Section 230, "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). Thus, to find
immunity, the statute requires that "( 1) the defendant be a
provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the
cause of action treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of
information; and (3) the information at issue be provided by
another information content provider." Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99
Cal.App.4th 816, 830 (2002); accord Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018, 1028-30 (9th Cir. 2003).
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs' claims treat PDX
as the "publisher" of the monographs, nor that PDX is a
"provider or user of an interactive computer service." C.T. 3839. Although Section 230 often arises in the context of
websites, it broadly applies to all interactive computer services,
i.e., "any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
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users to a computer server." 47 U.S.C. § 230(t)(2). See Zango,
Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1174-76 (9th Cir.
2009) (anti-malware software provider). Because POX enables
access by pharmacies to its servers, POX satisfies this
definition. C.T. 39.
The Court of Appeal found that Section 230 does not
apply because POX became an "information content provider"
by only allowing five-section monographs to be printed, at
Safeway's request. But under well-established law, Section
230 protects online providers for any acts taken in their capacity
as publishers or speakers, including editing content. It therefore
squarely protects POX's decision to alter its software code to
allow Safeway to print shorter versions of thousands of
monographs.
Section 230 defines "information content provider" as
"any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for
the creation or development of information provided through
the Internet or any other interactive computer service." 47
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U.S.C. § 230(t)(3). Applying this definition, courts have found
that "lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its
exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions- such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content- are barred." Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d
327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); see also Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986
(1Oth Cir. 2000) (AOL's editing and deletion ofallegedly
erroneous stock information did not transform it into content
provider); Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 57.
Thus, courts routinely dismiss claims based on an online
provider's decision to distribute some, but not all, third-party
content, or to re-organize that content. "The exclusion of
'publisher' liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising
the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered
material and to edit the material published while retaining its
basic form and message." Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1032 (emphasis
added); see also Gentrv, 99 Cai.App.4th at 817 (rejecting
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claims that eBay became content provider by creating forum for
feedback on sellers and categorizing user responses); Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003)
(dating website immune for claims premised on display of fake
profile although site asked pre-prepared questions and
organized responses into profiles). Similarly, courts have
upheld Section 230 immunity for providers of software
designed to display third-party content in a particular manner,
such as in categories. See Seldon v. Magedson, 2014 WL
1456316, at *4-6 (D. Ariz. 411 5114); O'Kroley v. Fastcase Inc.,
2014 WL 2197029, *3 (M.D. Tenn. 5/27/14).
Notably, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected
a theory similar to the one adopted by the Court of Appeal here.
In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009),
plaintiff alleged that Yahoo! was negligent under a gratuitous
undertaking theory because it promised but failed to delete a
fake user profile. The court reasoned that a plaintiff"cannot
escape section 230(c) by labeling as a 'negligent undertaking'
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an action that is quintessentially that of a publisher." Id. at
1102-03. Thus, plaintiff's attempt to hold Yahoo! responsible
for its failure to remove content- "something publishers do"failed. Id.
PDX similarly is not an "information content provider"
of the thousands of monographs accessible through its software.
It undisputedly did not author any of the content in the five-

section monographs, which WKH exclusively authored and
updated. That PDX acted as publisher and allowed Safeway to
print shorter monographs years before Plaintiff filled her
prescription is conduct that falls squarely within the heart of
Section 230 immunity. 8 Under the Court of Appeal's decision,
online providers now risk exposure to significant liability just
by excerpting third-party content regardless of whether the

8

The Court of Appeal cited Anthony v. Yahoo Inc., 421
F.Supp.2d 1257 (2006). But there, plaintiff alleged that
defendant had itself created the underlying unlawful contentfake dating profiles. Here, there is no dispute WKH
exclusively created and regularly updated the contents of the
monographs accessed through PDX's software. C.T. 38-39.
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information is false or legally required. This is not and cannot
be the law. See Section V.A, supra.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeal's published decision creates a
firestorm of liability for speech that falls squarely within the
broad protection of the First Amendment. It creates a new
cause of action, exposing everyone involved in publishing and
distributing truthful consumer product information to liability if
a jury believes they were merely negligent in allegedly failing
to provide every warning a consumer might demand with the
benefit of hindsight- and potentially even to strict products
liability. Given the pervasive role of the Internet, there can be
no question that the Court of Appeal's misconceived Opinion
will trample First Amendment rights.
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For all of the reasons discussed above, PDX respectfully
requests that the Court grant review in this matter and reverse
the Court of Appeal's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of July,
2014.
DAVIS WRJGHT TREMAINE LLP

Thomas R . Burke
Attorneys for Appellants and
Defendants PDX, INC. and
NATIONAL HEALTH
INFORMATION NETWORK, INC.

52

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.204(c), the text of
this brief, including footnotes and excluding the caption page,
table of contents, table of authorities, the signature blocks and
this Certificate, consists of 8,394 words in 14-point Times New
Roman type as counted by the Microsoft Word wordprocessing program used to generate the text.
Dated this 28th day of July, 2014.
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

Thomas R. Burke
Attorneys for Appellants and
Defendants PDX, INC. and
NATIONAL HEALTH
INFORMATION NETWORK, INC.

DWT 24 53 0846v3 0096667-00000 I

53

EXHIBIT A

Filed 6/19/14

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE

KATHLEEN HARDIN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

A137035

v.
PDX, INC., et al.,

(Alameda County

Defendants and Appellants.

Super. Ct. No. RG11600291)

PDX, Inc. claims the trial court erred when it denied a motion to strike brought
under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and refused to dismiss a negligence and
product liability action as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. Because the
plaintiff demonstrated a probability she may prevail on her claim, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Kathleen Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful
scarring after she began taking Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal.
According to her complaint, Hardin later learned that Lamotrigine carries a significant
risk of causing Stevens-Johnson syndrome (SJS) and associated toxic epidermal
necrolysis that resulted in her injuries, particularly when taken in combination with
another of her prescribed medications.
Hardin and her husband1 filed suit for negligence and product liability against
multiple defendants, including the physician who prescribed her Lamotrigine,
GlaxoSmithKline, which manufactured it, Safeway, Inc., where she purchased it, and
1For

simplicity, we will refer to plaintiffs jointly as Hardin.
1

Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. (WKH), which produced the drug information pamphlet, or
monograph, Safeway provided when it filled Hardin’s prescription. WKH monographs
offer summaries of information from official FDA physician package inserts and patient
medication guides written in lay language for consumers and are intended to provide a
written supplement to the oral counseling patients receive from their pharmacists when
they have a prescription filled. (See generally Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc. (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 709, 713 (Rivera).) Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication
guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by
the FDA. Rather, the monographs are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan
required under public law as approved by the Secretary of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services. (Pub.L. No. 104-180 (Aug. 6, 1996) 110 Stat. 1593.)
The action plan summarizes its goal by stating: “The purpose of this Action Plan
is to improve the quality and availability of useful information that is voluntarily
provided to consumers with their prescription medicines. The rationale for the Plan is
that providing consumers with useful information about their prescription medicines can
reduce the risk of preventable, medication-induced injury and improve health outcomes.”
The action plan goes on to describe useful information as “that which is sufficiently
comprehensive and communicated such that consumers can make informed decisions
about how to receive the most benefit from medicines and protect themselves from harm.
Both the substance and presentation of the information are important.” Nevertheless,
each monograph states that it is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of all risks
and benefits of the medication and cautions consumers against relying solely on the
monograph for information about the medication.
There does not seem to be any material factual dispute about the nature of PDX’s
activities. As explained in the declaration of Benjamin Loy, PDX’s vice president of
industry relations, in support of the motion to strike, PDX is “an independent provider of
software that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers.” One component of
its business involves disseminating patient drug education monographs authored by third
parties. To that end, its software “enables pharmacies to access [WKH’s] database of
2

Monographs. WKH is an independent publisher of medical information for the general
public concerning drugs approved for sale by the FDA. . . . [¶] PDX, Inc. does not author
the Monographs but instead, provides this information under an authorization in the data
license agreement between NHIN, PDX, Inc.’s affiliated company, and WKH.” PDX
and NHIN thus “function as pass through entities to distribute Monographs that are
prepared by WKH to retailers selling prescription drugs like Safeway” and are printed
and distributed to the individual customer when a prescription is filled.
Decisions about the content of these monographs were made by Safeway, not by
PDX. According to Mr. Loy, “WKH, as the [data] owner and licensor, writes, formats,
develops and updates the drug product information that PDX accesses through its license
with WKH. Neither PDX nor NHIN modify the drug product information in any manner
whatsoever.” Prior to 2005, PDX’s software enabled its licensees to print out either the
long (eight-section) or short (five-section) version of the monograph for any given drug.
The short version excluded sections under the headings “Before Using This Medication,”
“Overdose,” and “Additional Information.” The “Before Using This Medication” section
contains warnings about taking the drug that may include warnings about drug
interactions or complications due to coexisting medical conditions. In 2005, in response
to regulatory guidelines, PDX revised its software so that it would no longer print the
abbreviated monographs. For reasons not clear from the record, Safeway did not want to
utilize the full eight-section monographs and asked PDX to revise its software so that
Safeway could continue to print only the five-section versions. PDX complied with that
request after it obtained a release of liability and indemnity agreement from Safeway.
The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first
filled her prescription for Lamictal, and the only patient information she considered in
deciding whether to take the medication. The abbreviated warning utilized by Safeway
and provided to Hardin omitted what is referred to as the “Black Box” warning under the
heading “BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE” that stated: “SERIOUS AND
SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF
THIS MEDICINE. . . . Contact your doctor immediately if you develop rash symptoms,
3

including red, swollen, blistered or peeling skin. Treatment with this medication should
be stopped unless it is clearly determined that the medicine did not cause the rash. Even
if the medicine is stopped, a rash caused by this medicine may still become lifethreatening or cause serious side effects (such as permanent scarring).” Hardin says that
had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication.
WKH moved to strike Hardin’s claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure

2

section 425.16 (the “anti-SLAPP” statute) on the ground that the products liability and
negligence claims against it arose from protected speech concerning a public issue or an
issue of public interest. The trial court ruled that WKH’s production of drug monographs
was protected speech under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) and that Hardin had no
probability of prevailing on her claims because, following the rationale of Rivera, supra,
187 Cal.App.4th 709, she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty.
Accordingly, the court granted WKH’s motion and dismissed the claims against it.
Hardin amended her complaint to allege causes of action for negligence and
products liability against PDX, Inc. and National Health Information Network, Inc.
3

(NHIN). PDX also moved under the anti-SLAPP statute to strike Hardin’s claims,
which it argued were identical to the dismissed claims against WKH and barred for the
same reasons.
This time, the trial court disagreed. It determined that the activity underlying
PDX’s alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give
customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings about SJS
instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings. “Plaintiffs have
asserted acts by PDX that go beyond mere distribution of the WKH’s monographs.
Plaintiffs assert that in 2005 PDX revised its software program to prevent its customers,
including Safeway, ‘from printing the five section abbreviated monograph and allowed
2

Unless otherwise noted, further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3

Jointly referred to as PDX.
4

only the printing of the complete eight section monograph.’ [Citation.] According to Mr.
Loy, Senior Vice President of Industry Relations for PDX, Inc. and National Health
Information Network Inc., [citation], ‘[t]his software revision was made in response to
both regulatory guidelines for the provision of patient education information and an
internal recommendation by Jim Boyd, R.Ph., then Sr. Vice President [of] Network
Services NHIN.’ [Citation.] Then, in 2006, a Safeway representative contacted PDX
because it wanted to use the five section monograph, rather than the eight section
monograph with the warnings at issue here. [Citation.] In response, ‘[p]rogramming to
allow the system to provide the five section monograph was made available by PDX [] to
Safeway. . . .’ [Citation.] Given these facts, this is not a case in which a defendant
merely distributed information from a third party author or publisher.”
The court concluded that PDX’s reprogramming activities were not acts in
furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech within the meaning of
section 425.16 and denied PDX’s motion to strike. PDX filed a timely appeal from the
court’s order. (See § 904.1, subd. (a)(13).)
DISCUSSION
I. The Anti-SLAPP Statute
Unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech
or petitioning activity may be stricken pursuant to a motion filed under Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16. (See Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 90, 102.) This anti-SLAPP statute provides: “(b)(1) A cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution
in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the
court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) As used in this section, ‘act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
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Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review
by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or
a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16.) “The only way a defendant can make a sufficient threshold showing is to
demonstrate that the conduct by which the plaintiff claims to have been injured falls
within one of those four categories.” (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122,
1130.)
We consider an anti-SLAPP motion in a two-step process. “First, the court
decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of
action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendant’s burden is to
demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in
furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or
California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute.
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then
determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the
claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these
determinations considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating
the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (Equilon Enterprises v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon).)
We review the trial court’s determinations as to whether the plaintiff has shown a
probability of prevailing independently. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93
6

Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) An anti-SLAPP motion does not survive this prong “ ‘if the
plaintiff presents evidence establishing a prima facie case which, if believed by the trier
of fact, will result in a judgment for the plaintiff. [Citation.]’ ” (Fleishman v. Superior
Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 350, 356.) We neither “ ‘ “weigh credibility [nor]
compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable
to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has
defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.” [Citation.]’ ” (Nygard, Inc. v.
Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1036 (Nygard).) “In order to satisfy due

process, the burden placed on the plaintiff must be compatible with the early stage at
which the motion is brought and heard [citation] and the limited opportunity to conduct
discovery.” (Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 823, disapproved on
other grounds in Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 68, fn. 5.) Only a minimal showing of
merit is required. (Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 298, 318.)
We affirm if the trial court’s decision is correct for any reason, regardless of the
correctness of the grounds upon which it reached its conclusion. (In re Estate of Beard
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 776.)
II. Analysis
The trial court based its ruling on its conclusion that PDX’s role in the production
and dissemination of the short-form monograph Hardin received was not “conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest,” and, thus,
was beyond the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). We need not answer this
interesting question, for, assuming arguendo that Hardin’s claims against PDX arose
from protected first amendment activity, if credited at trial her evidence would be
sufficient to support a favorable judgment. (See Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683,
713–714 [plaintiff’s burden opposing anti-SLAPP motion is to state and substantiate a
legally sufficient claim]; Nygard, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1044.)
7

A. Rivera v. First Databank, Inc. Is Factually Inapposite
PDX argues that Hardin’s negligence claim fails under Rivera v. First DataBank,
Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 709. It maintains Rivera holds that, as a matter of law,
PDX has no duty to consumers who receive drug monographs through its software. We
are not persuaded that Rivera controls here.
The plaintiffs’ decedent in Rivera committed suicide shortly after he began taking
the anti-depressant drug Paxil. First DataBank, Inc. (First DataBank) published the drug
monograph Rivera received from his pharmacist. The plaintiffs alleged the monograph
omitted the FDA’s black-box suicide warnings for Paxil, and that the warnings it
included were vague, confusing, and buried in fine print. (Rivera, supra,187 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 713–714.) The trial court denied the motion (id. at p. 714), but the court of appeal
reversed. After concluding that the lawsuit targeted protected speech (§ 425.17, subd.
(c)), the court held that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success at trial
because they failed to establish First DataBank owed them a legal duty. (Rivera, supra,
187 Cal.App.4th at p. 719.) First, it noted, the plaintiffs presented no evidence
supporting their allegation that the monograph omitted the black box warning. (See
Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45 ([“plaintiff cannot rely
on the allegations of the complaint alone, but must present admissible evidence”].)
Second, the allegedly omitted warning would not have applied to the 50-year old Rivera
because it warned of suicide risks only among children and adolescents. (Rivera, supra,
187 Cal.App.4th at p. 719.)
This case is different. Unlike Rivera, here there was evidence that the black-box
warning had been deleted from the monograph Hardin received with her prescription.
Hardin attested that “[t]he Wolters Kluwer Health medicine information monograph I
received, read and relied upon in deciding to take Lamictal/Lamotrigine did not include
the section which is in capital letters and starts with WARNING: SERIOUS AND
SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF
8

THIS MEDICINE, that the rashes warned about appear as red, swollen, blistered, peeling
skin and that the rashes warned about could be life-threatening even if you stop taking the
medication and that the rashes warned about could cause serious side effects such as
permanent scarring.” The evidence Hardin submitted also contains the abbreviated
monograph described in her declaration alongside the full eight-section monograph
complete with the omitted warnings. In further contrast to Rivera, the omitted sections, if
included, would have applied to all potential consumers of Lamotrigine. The evidentiary
shortcomings presented in Rivera are not present here.
B. Rivera Does Not Address The Negligent Undertaking Doctrine
Rivera is also of limited precedential value for another reason: it does not address
Hardin’s theory that, in undertaking to provide patient drug monographs, PDX assumed a
duty of care under the negligent undertaking doctrine. (See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61
Cal.2d 520, 524 fn. 2 [“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the
light of the facts and the issue then before the court”].) This common law theory, restated
in section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter section 324A), “is one
of liability to third persons for physical harm caused when, under certain listed
circumstances, one negligently performs an undertaking to another. In its entirety,
section 324A reads: ‘One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to [perform] his undertaking, if [¶] (a) his
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or [¶] (b) he has
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or [¶] (c) the harm is
suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.’ [¶] . . .
Indeed, ‘[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes to act . . . may thereby become
subject to a duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all. [Citation] As ‘Dean Prosser
says . . . , “[i]f the defendant enters upon an affirmative course of conduct affecting the
9

interests of another, he is regarded as assuming a duty to act, and will thereafter be liable
for negligent acts or omissions[.]” ’ ” (Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604,
612–613 (Artiglio).)
FNS Mortgage Service Corp. v. Pacific General Group, Inc. (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1564 is illustrative. The defendant, IAPMO, promulgated a uniform
plumbing code, certified plumbing products that met its standards, and published a
directory listing certified products. The owners and developers of an apartment complex
sued IAPMO for property damage allegedly caused by defective, IAPMO-certified drain,
waste and vent pipe. (Id. at pp. 1566–1570.) Citing section 324A, the court of appeal
held that IAPMO assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out its
enterprise when it voluntarily undertook to identify pipe manufacturers that adhered to its
standards for the consuming public. (Id. at p. 1572; see also Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.
(1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 680, 684 [publisher that conducted product endorsement program
assumed a duty of ordinary care to consumers who relied on its endorsement].) Other
jurisdictions, although apparently no California courts, have considered that parties who
engage in providing medication warnings to consumers may be found to have assumed a
duty to use due care in carrying out their enterprise. (See Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer
Health, Inc. (E.D.Mo. July 30, 2013 No. 4:11-cv-325-JAR) 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis
106191*13 [failure to warn claims targeting WKH monographs withstood motion to
dismiss under assumption of duty principles]; Slater v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc. (E.D. Pa.
2011) 771 F.Supp.2d 524, 527–528 [negligent undertaking theory of duty withstood
frivolous joinder challenge]; Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy (Mass. 2002) 764 N.E.2d 814,
821–823 [where patient could reasonably interpret warning provided by pharmacy as
complete list of all known side effects, pharmacist’s duty was “commensurate with what
it appeared to have undertaken”].)
Here, Hardin presented evidence that PDX knew that enabling Safeway to print
the abbreviated monograph could place patients at risk, including, notably, the
10

acknowledgement in its 2006 agreement with Safeway that providing the full eightsection version would better enable patients to “use the medication properly and
appropriately, receive the maximum benefit, and avoid harm.” This record sufficiently
makes out a claim that PDX assumed a duty of care by undertaking to render services to
Safeway “of a kind [it] should have recognized as necessary for the protection of third
persons. . . .” (Artiglio, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 604).
Citing Rivera, PDX also argues it had no duty to Hardin because the abbreviated
Lamotrigine monograph included a warning that it did not cover all possible adverse
effects and advised patients to read the medication guide and consult their physicians
before taking the medication. We disagree with PDX’s view that, as a matter of law, this
language has any bearing upon the scope of its duty. The cited provisos and their
foreseeable effect on consumers are relevant to whether PDX acted with due care when it
enabled Safeway to omit warnings from WKH monographs, but it is the nature of PDX’s
undertaking, not the care with which it was carried out, that determines whether it
assumed a duty under section 324A in the first place.
PDX’s remaining arguments merit only brief attention. PDX claims Hardin failed
to show causation, but her declaration says the WKH monograph was the only
medication information she received, that she read and relied on it, and that she would
not have taken Lamotrigine had it included a warning about serious or fatal rashes. PDX
also asserts Evidence Code section 11554 bars Hardin from relying upon the indemnity
clause in PDX’s 2006 agreement with Safeway to prove negligence, but, assuming the
indemnity language is inadmissible, there is no reason to believe its exclusion would
prevent Hardin from proving her case.
PDX’s claim that section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act (47
U.S.C. § 230, hereinafter CDA) immunizes it from liability for providing electronic
4Under

Evidence Code section 1155, “Evidence that a person was, at the time a
harm was suffered by another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising from
liability for that harm is inadmissible to prove negligence or other wrongdoing.”
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access to WKH monographs is also unpersuasive. “The CDA provides that (1) ‘[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider’ and (2)
‘[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or
local rule that is inconsistent with this section.’ [Citation.] Section 230(f)(2) defines
‘interactive computer service’ as ‘any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
service, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet[.]’
An ‘information content provider’ is ‘any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service.’ [Citation.] ‘Congress clearly enacted § 230 to
forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its
editorial and self-regulatory functions.’ ” (Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2006) 421
F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (Anthony).)
Hardin’s claim against PDX does not arise from its role as the software or service
provider that enabled Safeway to access the WKH Lamotrigine monograph. Hardin sued
PDX because it intentionally modified its software to allow Safeway to distribute
abbreviated drug monographs that automatically omitted warnings of serious risks. As
the trial court found, “this is not a case in which a defendant merely distributed
information from a third party author or publisher.” PDX cites, and we are aware of, no
case holding the CDA to have immunized a defendant from allegations that it participated
in creating or altering content. (See Anthony, supra, 421 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1262–1263.)
“One need look no further than the face of the statute to see why. The CDA only
immunizes ‘information provided by another information content provider.’ (47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1).)” (Id. at p. 1263.)
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PDX also asserts that the First Amendment and Civil Code section 47, subdivision
(d)5 immunize it from liability for distributing what it describes as “truthful summaries of
the FDA’s Package Insert and Medication Guide.” It has not been established at this
juncture that WKH’s monographs are “truthful summaries” of official FDA proceedings,
that they qualify as “public journals” for purposes of the section 47, subdivision (d)
privilege, or that they “do nothing to dilute” the warnings in FDA-approved mediation
guides and package inserts and are not otherwise misleading. PDX’s evidence has not
defeated that submitted by Hardin as a matter of law (see Nygard, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1036), so its anti-SLAPP motion was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The order denying PDX’s anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed.

_________________________
Siggins, J.

We concur:

_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.

_________________________
Pollak, J.

5Civil

Code section 47 privileges a publication or broadcast “made [¶] . . . [¶]
(d)(1) By a fair and true report in, or a communication to, a public journal, of (A) a
judicial, (B) legislative, or (C) other public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in
the course thereof . . . .”
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business. I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 29} 2014, at San Francisco, Calif~_rnia.

VIJ~._(]J ~G
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Service List
Key:

[M] Delivery by Mail
[F] Delive b Facsimile

[FD]
[FM

(M+EJ

Nancy Hersh
Kate Hersh-Boyle
Hersh & Hersh
601 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 2080
San Francisco, CA 94102-6316

David Newdorf
NewdorfLegal
220 Montgomery Street, Suite 1850
San Francisco, CA 94104

Telephone: (415) 357-1234
Telephone: (415) 441-5544
Email: david@newdorf.com
Facsimile: (415) 441-7586
Email: nhersh@hershlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents Kathleen Hardin and Dane Hardin
IM+El

Marc G. Cowden
Galloway, Lucchese, Everson & Picchi
1676 N. California Blvd., 5'h Floor
Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Attorneys for Sharon Jamieson, M.D. &
Palo Alto Foundation Medical Group, Inc.

Telephone: (925) 930-9090
Facsimile: (925) 930-9035
Email: mcowden@glattys.com
JM+EI

Steven R. Enochian
Low McKinley Baleria & Salenko, LLP
2175 N. California Blvd., Suite 500
Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Attorneys for Taro Pharmaceutical U.S.A.,
Inc.

Telephone: (925) 627-3500
Facsimile: (925) 482-3384
Email: SEnochian@lmblaw.net
JM+EI

Jonathan Klein
Mark P. Iezza
Kelly, Hockel & Klein, P.C.
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2500
San Francisco, CA 941 04
Telephone: (415) 951-0535
Facsimile: (415) 391-7808
Email: jaklein@khklaw.com
miezza@khlaw.com

IMI

Shawn A. Toliver
Alex A. Graft
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP
333 Bush Street, Suite 1100
San Francisco, CA 94104

Telephone: (415) 362-2580
Facsimile: (415) 434-0882
Email: shawn.toliver@lewisbrisbois.com
alex.graft@lewisbrisbois.com
Attorneys for Safeway

Clerk for Hon. Gail Brewster
Bereola, Judge
Alameda County Superior Court
Dept. 19, Administration Building
1221 Oak Street, Third Floor
Oakland, CA 94612
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Clerk, California Court of Appeal
First Appellate District, Division 3
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
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